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Cost of Governance and Fiscal Deficit
in Nigeria: Evidence from State
Government Data
Ekeocha, P. and A. Ikenna-Ononugbo*
Abstract
Fiscal deficit has remained a predominant occurrence at both the Federal and state
government levels, and this has become a source of concern for economic managers.
At the individual state level, a quarter of the state governments consistently ran deficit
for more than six consecutive years, from the period 2007 to 2014. More importantly, the
combined overall fiscal balance of the state governments has resulted frequently in
deficit in the past two decades. Fiscal deficit is not bad in itself, but most of the state
governments are running fiscal deficit to sustain recurrent expenses, rather than
infrastructure development. Available studies on the determinants of fiscal deficit have
not considered cost of governance as an important determinant. Thus, the authors
investigated the effect of cost of governance and other determinants, on fiscal deficit
across the Nigerian states for the period 2008-2015. Using the dynamic panel of the
Arellano-Bond (Difference) GMM Estimators in the Keynesian framework, the results
revealed that cost of governance had fueled fiscal deficit at the state level in Nigeria. It
also showed that inflation, population size and economic growth had significant
impact on fiscal deficit across the Nigerian states. The authors underscored the need for
strengthening public financial management reforms, particularly, the Fiscal
Responsibility Act, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework, and the treasury single
account, at the sub-national level to ensure fiscal discipline. This will enable the state
governments to be more prudent and ensure that fiscal deficit is geared towards
infrastructure development.
Keywords: Fiscal Deficit, Governance, Heterogeneity.
JEL Classification Numbers: H62, H11, O38

I.

Introduction

I

n Nigeria, fiscal deficit1 has remained a predominant occurrence at both

the Federal and state government levels, even during economic boom,

and this is becoming a source of concern for economic managers. At the

*
1

The authors are staff of the Research Department, Central Bank of Nigeria. The usual disclaimer applies.
De La Dehesa (2010) defined fiscal deficits as a situation where governments spend more than they collect as

revenue.
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individual state level, a quarter of the state governments have consistently
been in deficit for more than six years, from 2007-2014. Over the past two
decades, the combined overall fiscal balance of the state governments has,
more often than not resulted in deficits. The fiscal deficits of the state
governments averaged N176.20 billion during the period 2008 and 2013. It
increased from N86.80 billion in 2008 to N272.50 billion in 2012, dropped to
N141.40 billion in 2013, and thereafter rose to N311.0 billion in 2014, because of
the drastic drop in international crude oil prices, which affected the share from
the Federation account.
Fiscal deficit in itself is neither good nor bad. However, it can be assessed in
relation to the economic situation. A country experiencing budget deficit, due
to building infrastructure or making profitable investments that will generate
higher revenue or taxes in the future, is often considered healthier than
countries experiencing deficit, due to unsustainable expenses. Incidentally,
state government expenditures have been geared mostly towards
(unsustainable) recurrent spending, with little resources for capital outlay.
Consequently, infrastructure and socio-economic conditions in most of the
states have remained in deplorable condition. Though budget deficits are
always a warning signal for analysts and investors, it is important to understand
why any country or state is experiencing a deficit.
The crash in international crude oil prices, which started in November 2014, did
put government finances in Nigeria, particularly, state governments finances,
in a precarious condition; such that the accumulation of salary and contractor
arrears becomes prominent. Despite the bail-out by the Federal government
to enable some of the state governments pay salary arrears, the unabated
downward pressure in crude oil prices continued to exert negative impact on
the revenue and finances of the state governments. Consequently, states are
forced to run fiscal deficit that could undermine their fiscal sustainability in the
medium-to-long-term. Aside the dwindling federation revenue, the undue
concentration of the bulk of financial resources at the states on recurrent
outlay (the cost of governance is seen as another major cause of the perennial
fiscal deficit observed at this level of government. Evidence indicates that
productive government expenditure improves economic growth, while high
administrative cost (high operating cost) dampens economic growth and
increases poverty (Adeolu and Osabuohien, 2007) and, by extension,
increases fiscal deficit. Other determinants of fiscal deficits from the literature
have also been put forward, including high unemployment rates, economic
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crisis, expansion opportunities, and economic performance. While there seem
to be empirical studies, regarding the determinants of fiscal deficit, the role,
cost of governance plays has not been properly investigated in the literature.
Available studies on the determinants of fiscal deficit have undermined the
cost of governance as an important determinant (Onafowora and Owoye,
2006; Rangarajan and Srivastava, 2005; Krause, 2000; Ijah, 2014; Fluvian, 2006;
Darrat, 1988; Barro, 1979; Attiya, et al., 2011; Adeolu and Osabuohien, 2007;
and Woo, 2003). This study, therefore, attempts to fill the gap by ascertaining
the role of cost of governance on the fiscal balance of State government in
Nigeria, using panel data econometric approach. The thrust of this paper,
therefore, is to empirically ascertain the determinants and, particularly, the
effect of cost of governance on states' fiscal deficit. The research questions this
paper seeks to answer are: what are the determinants of fiscal deficit across
states in Nigeria? What is the effect of cost of governance on fiscal deficit
across States in Nigeria? The import of the paper is the ability to draw the
attention of the state governments to the fact that prudent and effective
application of the budget is sine-qua-non to minimising fiscal deficit, if
empirical evidence is established for the cost of governance.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Following the introduction is
Section 2, which deals stylised facts on state government and fiscal deficit in
Nigeria. Section 3 focused on the literature review and theoretical framework,
while Section 4 was on methodology. Section 5 presented the analysis of results
on fiscal deficit and cost of governance in Nigeria, while Section 6 concluded
the paper.

II.

Stylised Facts: State Governments and Fiscal Deficit in Nigeria

Nigeria operates a federal system of government, whereby both the Federal
and the sub-national units derived their powers from the constitution. The
Nigerian fiscal federalism is such that the sub-national governments have
powers to expenditure, but not much power to revenue generation.
Accordingly, states and local governments depend on statutory allocation for
their sustenance, as the more lucrative revenues are collected and pooled
into the Federation account and shared in accordance with the subsisting
formula. However, the share of the Federal government, in the pooled
revenue, remained slightly higher than the share of the 36 states of the
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federation. Thus, the Federal government, to a large extent, is still saddled with
the responsibility of providing social amenities in all parts of the federation.
Considering that the states are sovereign in their own right, they are expected
to deliver public goods and services in order to achieve the fundamental
objectives and directive principles of state policy, enshrined in Section 16 of the
1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. To achieve this, the states
obviously adopt a budgetary framework that sets the substantive policy
priorities of the state government, the expected revenue and expenditure for
the fiscal year. It also determines the sources of borrowing to finance approved
expenditures in the case of a fiscal deficit. Incidentally, fiscal deficit have
remained the general norm for the state governments over the years. Fiscal
deficit of the state governments averaged N230.44 billion for the period 2008 to
2015. It increased from N86.80 billion in 2008 to N272.50 billion in 2012. It dropped
to N141.40 billion in 2013, but resumed its upward trend and rose to N610.1
billion in 2015, due to the drastic drop in international crude oil prices that
affected the share from the Federation account. As a ratio of GDP, fiscal deficit
averaged 0.4 per cent during the review period. The trend in fiscal deficit could
be explained by the increasing level of state governments' expenditure for
most part of the review period. State governments' total expenditure grew on
the average by 0.5 per cent per annum during the period. It increased from
N3,021.60 billion in 2008 to N4,046.80 billion in 2013, but declined to N1,246.30
billion in 2015. As a ratio of GDP, state governments' total expenditure
averaged 2.3 per cent in the review period (Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: State Governments' Expenditure and Fiscal deficit GDP Ratios (N'
Billion)
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The increasing expenditure status of the states, in the review period, could be
attributed to the growing cost of governance, including overhead cost;
personnel cost; and other economic factors, such as inflation. Cost of
governance increased by 53.2 per cent above the level in 2008 to N687.23
billion in 2014, but dropped to N507.70 billion in 2015. As a ratio of total states'
recurrent expenditure for the period 2008 to 2015, cost of governance
averaged 64.1 per cent, increasing from 55.0 per cent in 2008 to 77.5 per cent in
2015. Further breakdown of the cost of governance showed that personnel
cost accounted, averagely, for 58.1 per cent of the total during the period. It
trended upward for most part of the review period and rose from 45.9 per cent
in 2008 to 65.8 per cent in 2012, dropped to 58.2 per cent in 2014, but increased
to 63.7 per cent in 2015 (Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2: Decomposition of State Governments' Cost of Governance (Per
cent)

Another factor attributed to the rising government expenditure and hence
fiscal deficit is the pressure on domestic prices, as captured by the trend in the
inflation rate. The inflation rate declined from 15.1 per cent in 2008 to 10.3 per
cent in 2011. It rose again to 12.0 per cent in 2012, trended downward to 8.0 per
cent in 2013, but rose by 100 basis points to 9.0 per cent in 2015 (Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.3: Movements in State Governments' Deficit, Expenditure, Cost of
Governance and Inflation (Per cent)

Overall, the trend analysis showed some of the factors responsible for the
persistent rise in state governments' fiscal deficit over the review period were to
a large extent the rising cost of governance and inflation. However, it is
important to carry out a further empirical investigation to give credence to the
stylised facts, as we cannot rule out some other macroeconomic and
demographic factors.

III.

Literature Review

III.1

An Overview of Theories on Fiscal Deficit

There are three schools of thoughts on deficit financing: the Classical, the
Keynesian, and the Ricardian schools. According to the classical theory of
deficit, budget deficit (fiscal deficit) has the effect of increasing current
consumption by government or consumers, but this is counterbalanced by a
fall in investment. Perry (2014) opined that, by definition, if consumption rises,
savings must fall. A fall in savings raises interest rates, which then reduces
investment. Thus, crowding-out occurs when the budget deficit brings about
increase

interest rates and reduction in investment. This is explained with a

graphical illustration in Figure 3.1 of the loanable fund theory, propounded by
Robertson (1934). Savings is represented by the supply curve, while demand for
investment funds is captured by the demand curve, which is downward
sloping. As interest rates rise, individuals are more likely to save, but businesses
tend to invest less, all things being equal, provided all other economic factors
are held constant.
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If government borrows money to run a budget deficit, the demand for
loanable funds curve will shift out. This will raise interest rates and make
investment more expensive. Point A in Figure 3.1 represents the initial
equilibrium in the model, and Q1 is the quantity of loanable funds available to
private business at the initial equilibrium. When government borrows from the
money market to finance a deficit, the demand curve will move from
demand1 to demand2, and this will push interest rates (the cost of borrowing)
up. Invariably, businesses have to borrow at a higher interest rate, and will
eventually borrow less. The reduction in business demand for investment, the
difference between Q1 and Q3 in Figure 3.1 is the amount of crowding-out.
In a nutshell, government borrowing crowds out private business by increasing
the interest rate from 1 to 2, and reducing the quantity that business will be
willing to borrow from Q1 to Q3. The Classical economists, however, posited
that the loanable funds market, if left to itself, would balance savings and
investment, and keep the economy at or close to full employment. In that
case, there would be no need for government deficit spending, which they
believed is counter-productive in the sense that the crowding out effect
implied that deficit spending shifts funds from investment to government
consumption. For this reason, classical economists generally opposed
government deficit spending.
The Keynesian postulates differ from the standard Classical paradigm, as they
did not believe that an economy would experience full crowding out, if there
are slack in the economy. First, they allowed for the possibility that some
economic resources are unemployed and second, they presupposed the
existence of a large number of myopic or liquidity-constrained individuals.
Accordingly, they argued that the economy would experience only partial
crowding out, with practically no crowding out at times of deep recession.
There are several facets to this argument as the Keynesians believed that
savings and investment decisions are not only dependent on the rate of
interest. They argued that investment decision is a function of not only interest
rates, but primarily expectations of future profit and such expectations are
usually calculated by businesses, based on a number of factors, including the
“animal spirits” or the state of mind or emotional psychology of the investors.

118

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

March 2017

Figure 3.1: Supply and Demand for Loanable Funds meant for Government
borrowing

Source: Adapted from Perry (2014)

In the simplest Keynesian model, increasing the budget deficit by N1.00 causes
output to increase by the inverse of the marginal propensity to save. Many
traditional Keynesians, however, argued that deficits need not crowd out
private investment because of unemployed resources. They opine that
increase in aggregate demand enhances the profitability of private
investments, leading to higher investments at any level of interest rate. Thus,
deficits can stimulate aggregate savings and investments, despite the fact
that they raise interest rates. Since increased consumption is gotten from
otherwise un-utilised resources, interest rate cannot be assumed to be the only
variable that drives investment. Thus, investment might not necessarily
decrease if businesses have a positive view of economic prospects, despite
the fact that government spending raises interest rates.
Reducing government fiscal deficit is not easy, at least, politically. Following the
traditional Keynesian theory, if the policy maker manages to reduce the
government deficit, the country can slide into recession. Budget deficit is not
totally bad, despite its evil reputation. The good news about fiscal deficit,
following McDermott and Wescott (1996), is that it indicates that the
government is buying goods and services, paying wages to its employees, and
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making transfers to its needy citizens. This helps to put money into the economy
and raises the level of economic activity. Thus, a sudden break by the
government, even when in pursuit of well-intentioned attempt to balance the
budget, will lead to reduced business inventories, job cuts, and drastic
reduction in the flow of money into the economy.
The central argument in the Ricardian observation is that fiscal deficit merely
postpones taxes. Accordingly, rational agents tend to see beyond the intertemporal veil and assume that the present discounted value of taxes is a
function of real government spending, and not of the timing of taxes. This
foresight, as argued by Bernheim (1989), gives rise to the “Say's Law” for deficits:
the demand for bonds always rises to match government borrowing. Since the
timing of taxes does not affect an individual's lifetime budget constraint, it
cannot alter his consumption decisions. As a result, budget deficits (both
temporary and permanent) have no real effects. This logic, however, does not
depend on full employment of resources.

III.2

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework adapted is the Keynesian postulates on fiscal
deficit.

The theory is closer to explaining quite well the behaviour of

government deficit or why government experience fiscal deficit. The
Keynesian theory provides a complete explanation of the recent
phenomenon:

the rapid accumulation of government deficit at the sub-

national level, even in relatively boom and peaceful times.
Recall that under the Keynesian framework, fiscal deficits need not crowd out
private investment, since there are lots of unemployed resources. Accordingly,
the ensuing increase in aggregate demand boosts the profitability of private
investments, and brings about higher investments at any level of interest rate.
Thus, deficit may stimulate aggregate savings and investment, despite the fact
that they raise interest rates. Again, fiscal deficit indicate that government is
purchasing goods and services, paying employee's wages and making
transfers to its needy citizens. This helps to put money into the economy and
raises the level of economic activities, as such, most of the macroeconomic
variables, like unemployment, cost of governance, population size, economic
growth, and price level derive their existence therefrom.
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The corollary to the foregoing is that governments also run persistent annual
fiscal deficits when tax revenues are insufficient to fund government spending,
meaning that the state must borrow from the public, using bonds. Other similar
reasons, in tandem with the Keynesian postulates, are short-term, as well as
deeper structural, issues facing the country.
Some of the short-term reasons include the business cycle (economic
performance) effect in the country as earlier stated. Where countries
experience recession or sustained period of slow growth, the economic
downturn will produce minimal revenue inflow from the sources of revenue,
particularly direct and indirect taxes, notwithstanding the fact that
government is still expected to meet its statutory welfare spending. In other
words, the tax and government spending changes that happen automatically
at different stages of the business cycle will not be helpful. This means that part
of the fiscal deficit may be the consequence of the automatic stabilisers.
Following the Keynesian postulate, a large and rising fiscal deficit may be a
deliberate action by the government to employ expansionary fiscal policy to
boost aggregate demand, output and employment, specifically when private
and external sector demand are low, falling or stagnant. The Keynesians have
long favoured the use of targeted and timely fiscal stimuli, like labour-intensive
public works and investment in infrastructure projects, designed specifically to
kick-start a chronic lack of inadequate demand in the economy. Typical
factors that can contribute to fiscal deficit therefore include: slower economic
growth, high public spending; high unemployment rates; economic crisis; high
operating costs; expansion and business opportunities or a combination of
these factors. Fiscal deficit therefore, evolve to accommodate changes in
receipts (mainly taxes) and government expenditures. Surpluses increase
during period of robust GDP growth, when receipts are up and public
expenditures are down. Deficits, mostly occur and rise during economic
slowdowns, because receipts drop (driven by the declines in income tax,
arising from job losses), while expenditures rise (driven by increase in
unemployment insurance claims due to job losses).
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Empirical Literature

Although, there are few or no empirical studies on the cost of governance and
fiscal deficits, empirical studies abound on other determinants of fiscal deficits.
Krause (2000) showed that higher unemployment rates resulted in a rise in fiscal
deficit. Barro (1986) estimated the tax-smoothing theory of deficit model using
the United State data for two periods, 1920-40 and 1948-82, to determine if
deficit during the period represented structural shift in government fiscal policy
or usual reaction to other influences such as recession, inflation and
government spending. He concluded that fiscal deficit and the near-term
projections of deficit in the United States were mainly a reflection of the usual
responses to recession and, turned to anticipated inflation. Woo (2003)
discovered that in developed and developing countries, inflation, income,
financial depth, and population exerted a positive impact on fiscal deficits.
Attiya et. al. (2011) examined the economic, political and institutional sources
of budgets deficit of South Asia and the ASEAN countries by applying the
dynamic panel model and generalised method of moments of Blundell and
Bond (1998) for the period 1984 to 2010. The results showed that high income,
high inflation rate, trade openness and large budget to GDP ratio were the
macroeconomic factors, associated with large budget instability. They also
discovered that small countries with low population growth had more volatile
budget deficit, indicating that budget deficit decreased as population
increased, while high corruption, low institutional quality (legal and
bureaucracy) and conflicts (internal, external, ethnic and religious) caused
more variations in budget deficit. Also, Cameron (1978), Rodrik, (1998), and
Sanz and Velázquez, (2003), found a positive relationship between trade
openness and fiscal deficit. The major inference that could be drawn from
these studies was that citizens demanded more redistribution via additional
public expenditures, as trade openness increased in other to hedge against
external risk.
Darrat (1988), investigated the relationship between federal budget deficit
and trade deficit by applying the multivariate Granger-causality tests on the
U.S. quarterly data, covering the period 1960: 1 to 1984: IV. He tested four
hypotheses, namely: budget deficit cause trade deficit (the conventional
view); trade deficit cause budget deficit; and both variables (although highly
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correlated) were causally independent, and there was a bi-directional
causality between the two variables. Although, his findings partially supported
the conventional view, strong evidence was found for the causality from tradeto-budget deficit.
Murwirapachena et al., (2013) investigated the determinants of budget deficit
in South Africa for the period 1980-2010, using the vector error correction model
(VECM). Their results revealed that foreign reserves foreign debt,
unemployment, economic growth and government investment explained the
variations in fiscal deficits during the study period.
Generally, literatures on the determinants of fiscal deficit are sparse for Nigeria.
Ijah (2014) showed that budget deficit was driven by trade deficit in Nigeria.
Onafowora and Owoye (2006) also confirmed this. They applied cointegration and Granger-causality tests to data from 1970-2001 and found that
budget deficit in Nigeria were driven by trade deficit. Udoh, et. al. (2012)
examined the relationship between government-type and fiscal deficit in
Nigeria by applying ordinary least square (OLS) on time series data for the
period 1970-2010. They found that government-type did matter for fiscal
operations in Nigeria. Specifically, the authors found that democratic regimes
in Nigeria did accumulate fiscal deficit, contrary to earlier expectation. In
addition, the findings showed that there was a strong inclination for fiscal
deficit to decrease with financial liberalisation, while liberalisation of foreign
trade led to increase in fiscal deficits.
Basically, the empirical evidences differ across countries, and even within
countries because of the use of different methodologies for the same country
data. Equally apparent is the fact that most of the studies concentrated on the
experiences of industrialised countries. There are relatively few empirical
studies on the determinants of fiscal deficits for the developing countries,
particularly for Nigeria. This study intends to extend the literature in this area by
establishing or otherwise, the relationship between cost of governance and
fiscal deficit at the state governments level in Nigeria.
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Based on the adapted theoretical framework for this study and previous
related studies, the empirical model is presented in Equation (1) as:

Where 'i' indexes states't' indexes time, ‘mi' is the error, arising from individual
state heterogeneity or differences (as we assume that there are unobserved
states' individual heterogeneity)2; and ‘eit' is the error term across time and
individual specific effects. 'Fdef' is fiscal deficit. Similarly, 'cog', 'totrev', 'pop',
'infl' 'unemp' and 'ecog' are cost of governance, state total revenue, state
population size, inflation, state unemployment rate and economic growth
rate, respectively.
The a priori expectations of the parameters in equation 1 are as follows:
Ÿ

β1 > 0; that is, an increase in the ratio of cost of governance (or
government expenditure on overhead and personnel cost) is
expected to increase fiscal deficit;

Ÿ

β2 < 0; that is, a decrease in the ratio of state total revenue to total
shared federal collectible revenue will increase fiscal deficit;

Ÿ

β3 > 0; that is, an increase in the population (especially non-working
population) of individual states, will raise the demand for public
services, which will drain the state treasury, causing an increase in
government spending and, in the absence of increase in revenue,
lead to fiscal deficit;

Ÿ

β4 > 0; that is, an increase in the rate of inflation will lead to a drain of
the treasury as the cost of borrowing will increase, leading to
increase in fiscal deficit;

Ÿ

β5 > 0; that is, an increase in the rate of unemployment will raise the
demand for social services and in the absence of increase in
revenue, will drain the treasury, leading to increase in fiscal deficit;
and

2

The basic idea in the panel data analysis that the individual relationships will have the same parameters known

as the pooling assumption is most times not correct
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β6 < 0: that is, a decrease in the rate of economic growth will mean
decrease in government revenue, in the face of increase in
expenditure, due to statutory and discretionary spending, probably
to stimulate economic activities, thus leading to increase in fiscal
deficit.

One of the characteristics of panel data is that it can provide information on
individual state's behaviour. It can also capture features across states and over
time; having both the cross-sectional and time series dimensions. However,
endogeneity issues are usually of concern, especially in panel data analysis. To
overcome this problem, variants of the dynamic panel data models in
equation 2 i.e. the dynamic GMM, dynamic difference GMM and dynamic
two stage GMM are estimated.

This dynamic model is specified because the static panel estimates, as do the
OLS models, omit dynamic effects causing the problem of dynamic bias (Bond,
2002; Baum, 2006) and, as such, do not allow for the study of dynamics of
adjustment (Baltagi, 2008).
Omitted dynamics means that such models are mis-specified, because they
omit the entire history of the explanatory variables (Greene, 2008; Bond, 2002).
Second, many authors posit that the dynamic panel model is designed
specially for a situation where “T” is smaller than “N” to control for dynamic
panel bias (Bond, 2002; Baum, 2006; Roodman, 2006; Roodman, 2009, and
Baltagi, 2008)3. The problem of potential endogeneity is also much easier to
address in the dynamic panel models than in the static and OLS models that do
not allow the use of internally-generating instruments. An underlying
advantage of the dynamic GMM estimation is that all variables from the
regression that are not correlated with the error term (including lagged and
differenced variables) can be potentially used as valid instruments (Greene,
2008). It also gives room for the choice of the most appropriate GMM, whether
it is “difference-GMM”, developed by Arrelano and Bond (1991); or the
“System-GMM, established by Arrelano and Bover (1995) and Blundel and
Bond (1998).
3

There are generally three panel data types; namely, short panel with many individuals and few time periods

which is our case in this study. Others are long panel comprising many periods and few individuals, and large
panel comprising many time periods and many individuals.
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The study, however, chose the difference GMM of Arellano and Bond (1998),
because the estimated equation gave the best result and fulfilled the
underlying assumptions for dynamic panel methodology. The objectives of the
study were, therefore, investigated by estimating variants of the dynamic
panel data model in Equation (2). Dynamic models are very important,
especially in economics, because many economic relationships are dynamic
in nature and should be modeled, as such (Asteriou and Hall, 2011).

IV.2

Data and Measurement

The data for the study were sourced from the National Bureau of Statistics
(NBS), and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Annual Report and Statistical
Bulletin. The data covered the 36 states of Nigeria including the Federal Capital
Territory, between the period 2007 and 2014. The period is justified by
availability of data. Data on fiscal deficit of the states and total revenue were
sourced from the CBN Annual Report for the period of study, while inflation was
sourced from the CBN Statistical Bulletin. Data on unemployment rates were
obtained from the NBS Publication, while population data were sourced from
the 2006 population census report. However, the population figures for the
2007 to 2014 were estimated by the authors on the assumption that annual
population growth rate for Nigeria would be 2,8 per cent.
Cost of governance was defined as the recurrent expenditure, associated with
personnel and overhead costs. It was believed that this category of cost
represented the administrative cost of running government at this level, whose
data were not available on individual state basis. The cost of governance was
taken as a ratio of the state total expenditure and multiplied by 100 to
normalise the data along the other data on consumer price index,
unemployment rate and population rate, which were all in percentage.
Similarly, to bring the other variables to the same unit of measurement, total
revenue was taken as a ratio of federally collectible-revenue (the net amount
designated for sharing amongst the three-tiers of government) and multiplied
by 100, while fiscal deficit was taken as a ratio of total state revenue, multiplied
by 100.
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Estimation Issues and Procedures

This study focused on investigating the role of the explanatory variables,
particularly the cost of governance on fiscal deficit across states in Nigeria,
using the dynamic panel data approach. Ordinarily, the number of states (37)
and the period make it practically impossible to go for pooled regression so
that we do not lose the states' individual differences. Since the time dimension
is less than 30, the more robust estimation model turned out to be the dynamic
panel GMM approach. The dynamic panel Generalised Method of Moments
(GMM) estimation employs the appropriate lags of the instrumental variables
to generate internal instruments, while employing the pooled dimension of the
panel data. In other words, it does not impose restrictions, regarding the length
of each individual time dimension in the panel. There is, therefore, the use of
suitable lag structure to exploit the dynamic specification of the data. The
study estimated the variants of the dynamic GMM; differenced GMM and
system GMM. Sometimes the lagged levels of the regressors are poor
instruments for the first-differenced regressors. In such case, one augments with
“system GMM”. The system GMM estimator uses the levels equation to obtain a
system of two equations: one differenced and one on levels. By adding the
second equation, additional instruments can be obtained.
Thus, the variables in levels in the second equation are instruments with their
own first differences and this usually increases efficiency (Mileva, 2007).
However, two important points to note is that first, because system GMM uses
more instrument than the difference GMM, it may not be appropriate to use
system GMM with a dataset with a small number of states or countries. When
the number of instruments is greater than the number of states or countries, the
Sargan test may be weak.
The system GMM was also estimated because the difference GMM had been
found to have poor finite sample properties, in terms of bias and imprecision,
particularly when the lagged levels of the series were only weakly-correlated
with the subsequent first differences (weak instruments). Difference GMM may
be subject to a large downward finite-sample bias, especially when the
number of time periods available is very small. Hsiao (1986) argues that OLS
levels will give an estimate of the coefficient of and AR(1) model that is bias
upwards in the presence of individual-specific effects, and that within groups
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estimate will give an estimate of the coefficient that is seriously biased
downwards in short panels (Nickel, 1981). Thus, a consistent estimate can be
expected to lie between the OLS level and within the groups estimates. In other
words, a difference GMM estimate that has coefficient close to that of within
group estimates is downward bias. Difference GMM with weak instruments will
also be downward bias. Despite all these, the difference GMM turned out to be
the best in all the variants of the dynamic GMM estimated.
To investigate the specific objectives, various models (one-step and two-step
difference GMM estimators) were estimated for Equation (2). The objective of
examining the effect of cost of governance on fiscal deficit was duly carried
out. Other explanatory variables, namely: total revenue, population size,
inflation, and unemployment rates were also incorporated to ascertain their
respective effects. The dependent variable was the change in fiscal deficit,
divided by its lag which, taken to be the change in fiscal deficit as a function of
the growth in the explanatory variables in this study.
In investigating the specific objective of the study, reference is made to 'β1' in
Equation (2). The heterogeneity of the cost of governance across the states
was taken into consideration. Xtabond2 was used in the estimation of the onestep and two-step difference GMM estimation because of its usefulness in
fitting two closely related dynamic panel data models, that is, the ArellanoBond (Difference) GMM estimator and the Blundell-Bond (System) GMM
estimator.
In the first set of models for the one-step difference GMM estimator, the first
option model had no lag interval specified for the instruments. However, in the
second option model, lag interval for the instruments and with collapse was
included. Different lag intervals (1 5) and (2 4) were employed, with the best
result reported with lag interval (1 5).
The Sargan's test (1958, 1988) and Hansen's J test (1982) were used to verify the
validity of the instruments. This was to ensure the validity of the instruments and
that the number of instruments produced by the lag interval did not exceed
the number of groups (states) in the model. The third option model modified the
second option model by allowing for the computation of Difference-in-Hansen
tests for exogeneity of instrument subsets. This involved suppressing the nomata
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option from the option 2. In the second set of models on two-step difference
GMM estimator, the first option model was the inclusion of 'two-step' option in
the former model without a lag. However, in the second option, we specified
lag interval for the two-step GMM estimator with collapse and in the third
option we included both the lag interval and 'mata' options with collapse.

V. Analysis of Results
Table 4.1 presented the descriptive statistics of the variables that went into the
empirical estimations. This was crucial to ensure that the data met the
assumptions that were required for a more robust statistical test.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Sample: 2007 - 2014

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis

FDEF

COG

UNEMP

TREVR

INFL

POP

GR

-4.146655
-2.750000
78.70000
-354.1900
30.47979
-5.401482
61.90728

44.83203
44.05500
97.56000
0.000000
18.79096
0.314214
2.784251

19.82368
18.88000
67.40000
1.300000
9.602577
0.923641
5.725409

1.354595
0.980000
10.58000
0.000000
1.345940
3.601022
19.01166

10.71250
11.05000
15.10000
6.600000
2.834296
0.059192
1.701081

4.306588
3.960000
11.73000
1.450000
1.955311
1.688125
6.434003

7.573750
7.670000
8.600000
6.940000
0.519915
0.494133
2.488965

Jarque-Bera 44236.85 5.444791
Probability
0.000000 0.065717

133.6971 3801.660 20.98153
0.000000 0.000000 0.000028

286.0278 15.26652
0.000000 0.000484

Sum
-1227.410 13270.28
Sum Sq. Dev. 274060.2 104164.6

5867.810 400.9600 3170.900
27201.80 534.4084 2369.804

1274.750 2241.830
1127.856 79.74194

Observations

296

296

296

296

296

296

296

Source: Computed by the Authors

The description of the data was shown in Table 4.1. Fiscal deficit (FDEF)
averaged at negative 4.1 per cent, indicating that the fiscal deficit across the
states was moderately low. The low range was indicative of the years of surplus
across some states. The cost of governance (COG) recorded an average of
44.8 per cent, while the unemployment rate, across the states was 19.8 per
cent. Inflation (INFL) was also relatively high at 10.7 per cent, while the average
GDP growth rate, population (POP) and ratio of state total revenue to total
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shared federal collectible revenue were 7.6, 4.3, and 1.4 per cent, respectively.
The distribution of the variables showed that they were leptokurtic and
positively-skewed. The probability of the Jarque-Bera showed that the
variables were normally-distributed at 1 and 5 per cent respectively, except
cost of governance that was normally-distributed at 10 per cent. The number of
observations was the same across all the variables, indicating that the panel
variable was strongly balanced.
Table 4.2 displayed the correlation matrix of all the variables. The apriori
expectation of the variables was also depicted with the correlation matrix. All
the variables maintained their apriori expectations, except GDP growth rate,
which posted a positive correlation with the dependent variable. From Table
4.2, cost of governance (COG), and economic growth, had positive
correlation with fiscal deficit (FDEF). However, only the cost of governance was
significant. Other variables, including unemployment, ratio of state total
revenue to total shared federal collectible revenue, inflation, and population,
all had negative relationship with the dependent variable. Ratio of state total
revenue to total shared federal collectible revenue and population was
significant, while unemployment and inflation were not.
Table 4:2 Covariance Analysis: Ordinary
Sample: 2007 - 2014
Correlation
Probability

FDEF

COG

FDEF

1.000000
-----

COG

0.134550 1.000000
0.0206
-----

UNEMP

TREVR

UNEMP

TREVR

INFL

POP

0.014472 0.014564 1.000000
0.8042
0.8030
----0.156866 0.097240 0.060088 1.000000
0.0068
0.0949
0.3028
-----

INFL

0.011445 0.029106 0.139598 0.227614 1.000000
0.8445
0.6180
0.0162
0.0001
-----

POP

0.165997 0.047871 0.030308 0.254960 0.046520 1.000000
0.0042
0.4119
0.6035
0.0000
0.4252
-----

GR

GR

0.028395 0.118318 0.046776 0.022437 0.102424 0.048950 1.000000
0.6266
0.0419
0.4227
0.7007
0.0785
0.4014
-----

Source: Computed by the authors
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Empirical Analysis

The results of the models (one-step and two-step difference GMM estimators)
were shown in Table 1.3. For all the models estimated, the Hansen diagnostics
tests showed that the models were suitable. The Hansen J-test statistic
indicated that the instruments were appropriately uncorrelated with the
disturbance process. Thus, this made the instruments valid and satisfied the
orthogonality conditions. Also, autocorrelation tests (AR1and AR2) indicated
that there was no problem of serial correlation in the models.

V.2

Fiscal Deficit and Cost of Governance

Table 1.3 presented the three models each for one-step and two-step
Arellano-Bond (Difference) and system GMM, respectively. In each of the
models, the number of instruments did not exceed the number of states
(groups). The diagnostics were also satisfactory, but the DGMM2 option was
preferred to other options. Since diagnostics were also confirmed to be
satisfactory, any statistical inference drawn from the regression results was
assumed to be valid. The interpretation focused on the significance, sign and
size of the estimated coefficients.
The DGMM2 model showed the relationship among fiscal deficit, cost of
governance and other explanatory variables. The findings indicated that cost
of governance had a significant and positive influence on fiscal deficit and
portended an important driver in the variation of fiscal deficit across states in
Nigeria. In other words, cost of governance contributed to the variation in fiscal
deficit across states in Nigeria. From Table 4.3, it explained 59.5 per cent of the
variation in fiscal deficit across states in Nigeria. Unemployment, state total
revenue, population, economic growth and inflation, all maintained their
respective a priori expectations. However, while inflation, population and
economic growth significantly affected fiscal deficit across States in Nigerian,
unemployment, and state total revenue as a ratio of federally-collectible
revenue do not affected fiscal deficit across State in Nigeria, significantly.
In terms of size and explanatory power, population and cost of governance
explained more than 50. 0 per cent of the variation in fiscal deficit across states
in Nigeria and found to be significant at 1.0 per cent. Unemployment rate and
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state total revenue as a ratio of federally-collectible revenue explained less
than 12.0 per cent of the variation in fiscal deficit across states and were found
not to be significant. Overall, cost of governance could explain a substantial
variation in fiscal deficits across State in Nigerian during the study period.
Table 4:3 One-Step and Two-Step Arellano-Bond (Difference); and System
GMM Regression for Fiscal Deficit and Cost of governance (2007-2014)
(1)
VARIABLES

L.fdef

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

DGMM1DGMM2SGMM1SGMM2DGMM2
SGMM1
SGMM2
CL-a
CL-a
CL-a
CL-a

unemp
Trevr

In

Pop
Gr

(9)

SGMM2END-CLa

SGMM2END-CLb
-0.286
(1.227)
0.0482
(0.515)
0.0920
(0.368)
1.951
(10.51)
13.02
(21.41)

-0.231
(0.229)

-0.00115
(0.0965)

-0.231
(0.229)

0.185** 0.169*** 0.183** 0.216***
(0.0729) (0.0627) (0.0757) (0.0513)

0.487***
(0.165)
-0.0667
(0.244)
-11.59
(9.883)

0.487***
(0.165)
-0.0667
(0.244)
-11.59
(9.883)

0.321**
(0.129)
-0.0294
(0.211)
-7.425
(6.563)

0.341***
(0.128)
-0.0553
(0.185)
-7.743
(6.657)

0.354***
(0.125)
-0.0313
(0.227)
-7.511
(5.982)

0.331**
(0.130)
-0.0854
(0.154)
-7.653
(4.984)

-3.514**

1.171

0.991

1.001

-0.205

-4.292*

-1.249

(1.512)
-66.80***
(25.72)
-11.93**
(5.088)

0.595***
(0.178)
-0.0811
(0.218)
-12.04
(8.507)
4.984***
(1.667)
-83.85**
(35.06)
-12.48**
(5.240)

-0.211
(0.536)
-0.0485
(0.247)
0.371
(0.418)
-1.097
(4.002)
0.340
(12.23)

(1.512)
-66.80***
(25.72)
-11.93**
(5.088)

(1.910)
-1.510
(1.348)
0.392
(2.418)
-18.09
(12.45)

(1.907)
-1.551
(1.278)
-0.918
(2.940)
-6.043
(10.63)

(1.514)
-1.268
(1.344)
-0.295
(1.734)
-14.33
(14.10)

(1.092)
-0.0723
(0.986)
0.242
(1.899)
-6.571
(12.15)

(2.336)
-42.06
(31.20)
-7.178
(6.427)
276.7
(186.7)

(8.674)
29.97
(85.09)
9.759
(24.49)
-258.6
(770.9)

222

222

222

259

259

259

259

222

222

L2.fdef
Cog

(8)

-3.514**

Constant

Observations
Number of
sid
state effect
year effect
Hansen_test
Hansen Prob
Sargan_test

37

37

37

37

37

37

37

37

37

YES
NO
3.513
0.476
7.587

YES
NO
3.513
0.476
7.587

YES
NO
4.537
0.475
5.534

YES
NO
0.158
0.691
0.605

0.0379

0.354

0.437

AR(1)_test
AR(1)_Pvalue
AR(2)_test
AR(2)_Pvalue
No. of
Instruments

-1.494

-1.494

-1.883

YES
NO
29.08
0.308
84.11
4.80e08
-1.642

YES
NO
5.020
0.414
11.78

0.108

YES
NO
29.08
0.308
84.11
4.80e08
-1.846

YES
NO
5.020
0.414
11.78

Sargan Prob

YES
NO
22.35
0.322
60.72
5.50e06
-1.489

-1.681

-1.037

-0.331

0.135

0.136

0.135

0.0650

0.0596

0.101

0.0927

0.300

0.740

0.357

0.769

0.357

1.047

1.123

1.030

1.049

0.713

-0.875

0.721

0.442

0.721

0.295

0.261

0.303

0.294

0.476

0.382

11

27

11

34

13

34

13

14

10

0.108

0.0379

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Post Estimation Results

The post estimation results verified the validity of the instruments, as well as the
heterogeneity test. Also confirmed were the AR(1) and AR(2) tests. The results in
table 4.3 presented strong evidence against the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions were valid. Again, the number of instruments was not
more than the number of groups (the states). The result for AR(1) process was
rejected, while the result for AR(2) in the first difference for DGMM2, was not
rejected. This is more important as it detected the autocorrelation in levels.

VI.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendation

This study was able to establish that cost of governance has significant effect
on fiscal deficit across the Nigerian states. This empirical evidence alluded to
the structuralists' theoretical view that governments, most times, are inefficient
and this leads to fiscal deficit. One of the major concerns in fiscal management
is the manner in which public resources are managed. From the empirical
results, we can infer that undue concentration of the bulk of the financial
resources at the state level of government towards recurrent outlay, and
particularly cost of governance, contributes to the perennial fiscal deficit
observed at this level of government. This underscores the need for
strengthening public financial management reforms (like Fiscal Responsibility
Act, the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework, and the Treasury Single
Account) in states where such reforms are in operation and domesticate
where it has not. This will engender fiscal discipline and, thus, propel states to
cut down on fiscal deficit over time, as they channel more resources to
infrastructure development.
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